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Abstract 
The railway traffic management and security system are undergoing a renewal. Computer 
based systems are becoming the backbone that control moving trains. At the same time, 
cyber-attacks are becoming more common in the sphere of industrial control systems. The 
purpose of this thesis is to show how the trusted computing module can help mitigating 
attacks on industrial control systems. 
 
The thesis introduces the basic framework of social trust and the options available to 
expand that trust into the computer domain with the trusted platform module and 
attestation. Industrial control system attacks such as Stuxnet, Triton and Industroyer are 
introduced to present vectors on how the railway security system can be targeted in a 
cyber-physical attack. The thesis also briefly examines the Finnish Railway security system 
and traffic management. 
 
Study was conducted by means of intervention methodology. A background study was 
made concerning the implementation of a simulation environment for testing integrity 
failures in rail traffic. Testing was conducted to find out if integrity measurements are 
needed in this environment. 
 
The findings show that attacks can generate incidents that can be noticed by monitoring 
firmware integrity. The study also shows that in a rail security environment where 
measured boot and attestation have been implemented, integrity deviations are not only 
easily noticed but also possible to pinpoint. 
 
The simulation framework developed in this study uses containers to simulate devices. 
Admittedly this is a limited approach when measuring firmware integrity. Containers 
illustrating the firmware startup and runtime, can adequately showcase complex structures 
of attestation with multiple devices. The scope of the study we hope to expand into testing 
on real rail security systems. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Railway infrastructure has been secured by a reliable infrastructure based on 
relays for decades. However, these systems lifecycle is ending. Old systems are 
replaced by new computer-based systems. (Buurmans et al. 2018.) 
 
The shift to computer-based systems will bring targeted cost savings, but also the 
inheritance of all security weaknesses. These are new challenges for the rail 
industry. In order to make the change smoothly while new safety systems are 
introduced, new personnel, methods and standardization are needed to maintain 
security. (Buurmans et al. 2018.) 
 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), have seen a ramp-up in cyber-attacks during 
the last 10-years. Before this era, cyber security was not a crucial part of the ICS. 
(Assante & Lee 2015; Caracano et al. 2018; Langner 2013.) 
 
The integrity of the software in ICS is important, but so is the option of remote 
programming (Stumpp 2019). Restrictions for programming or updating can 
render a device inoperable. 
 
The challenge is to notice integrity failures in ICS within a time frame when 
incident prevention is possible (Langner 2013). The failure notification should 
provide additional information so that measures can be taken faster than with a 
general notice of failure (Chien et al. 2011). 
 
1.1 Purpose of the thesis 
Previous ICS security systems where implemented without a connection to the 
Information Technology (IT) segment. In the railway industry, the security system 
consisted of relays. These would provide security without intervention from a 
computer-based system. Today every new track section is controlled by a 
computer system responsible for the security. (Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018.) 
 
 In the past, the rail industry would implement the relay-based security system, 
verify the security implementation and put it into production (Kantamaa & 
Sorsimo 2018). Integrity failures could be monitored through analog signals. In a 
computer-based system this is not enough, a new verification method is needed. 
There is no unified solution for monitoring the computer-based security systems 
integrity in the rail industry (Stumpp 2019). 
 
The purpose of this study is to incorporate an integrity monitoring solution for the 
computer-based security ICS in a railway environment. The aim is to simulate the 
implementation to provide an example for further studies. In a larger scale, the 
aim is to help the rail industry and others in implementing trusted computing. 
 
This thesis was commissioned by the Cyber Security Research Team at Nokia 
Bell Labs in Espoo, Finland, as an extension to their prior research into Trusted 
Computing. 
 
1.2 Research questions and scope 
The thesis research questions are: 
• How can a firmware integrity failure in the security system lead to a 
dangerous situation in the rail environment? 
• How can a railway traffic operator validate the firmware integrity of 
the security system? 
 
The first question evaluates the need to monitor the integrity of railway security 
systems. The question can be answered by exploring attacks made on similar 
systems and then simulating them on the railway system. 
 
The second question seeks to find a solution to make integrity monitoring 
accessible for the traffic operator. Active integrity monitoring has not been a 
requirement for device manufacturers (Stumpp 2019). The question also seeks to 
accomplish faster mitigation times on integrity failures to prevent incidents. By 
utilizing the simulation, tests can be conducted to evaluate integrity monitoring by 
an operator. 
 
 The focus of this thesis is on the railway security system implemented in Finland. 
A simulation scenario is implemented and presented in this study. The Trusted 
Platform Module specification 2.0 by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) will be 
used as the integrity monitoring solution. We will follow the Personal Computer 
(PC) implementation. 
 
1.3 Research method and material 
The research method is intervention. This study will provide a method of testing 
an integrity monitoring solution for devices attached to a railway security system. 
The purpose is to increase the security of a system. (Kananen 2017.) 
 
Technology for firmware measurements have been accessible for 20 years. This 
have been used in monitoring the integrity of the PC platform, other computer 
platforms have not yet adopted the method. We strongly believe that by 
developing a framework that can demonstrate benefits in different cases, we can 
accelerate the implementation of this technology. A reason why the simulation 
framework is developed to be used on a single computer is the flexibility of 
demonstration. 
 
Implementing a new system into a real railway security system is not applicable 
without testing. There are very strict standards, on testing new components to a 
railway security system (Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018). 
 
However, the rail industry has testing facilities and equipment that could be used 
for testing. The problem is lack of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
implementations in the existing equipment. This is a requirement for measuring 
the integrity on the computer-based security system. 
 
Therefore, we developed a simulation framework to test our proposed solution. 
By using background material on the Finnish railway security implementation, 
containerization and software TPMs, we were able to build our own test 
framework for evaluation. 
 
 In the theory section, scientific literature is reviewed, the concepts of trust and 
asymmetric cryptography is explained and the characteristics of cyber attacks are 
studied. In addition, the concepts of TPM, attestation and virtualization are 
examined with reference to the railway security system. Based on the gathered 
information, a simulation environment where built on which tests can be run. 
 
Establishing integrity measurements in computer-based systems follows the 
Trusted Computing Groups (TCG) specifications. The specification for the PC 
platform has wide adoption, Microsoft Windows have required Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM) to include a TPM 2.0 implementation on new computers 
since 2016 (TPM recommendations 2018). 
 
1.4 Phases of the thesis 
Chapters 2–4 introduce the conceptual basis of this study. Chapters 5 and 7 are 
describing the structure of the simulation framework made for the case study of 
the rail traffic management system from chapter 6. Chapter 8 analyzes and 
presents the results of the simulation. Chapter 9 presents a summary of 
conclusions made in the study. 
 
2 TRUST 
The concept of trust in computer systems originates from social trust. The focus 
of this thesis is on the aspect of containing trust in computer systems. This 
chapter is an introduction to the general idea of social trust and how it can be 
implemented into computer systems. 
 
2.1 A philosophical view on trust 
Fukuyama (1995) states that trust does not reside in integrated circuits and it is 
not reducible to information. He defines trust as the expectations one has on 
others within a community of regular, honest and cooperative people that share 
common norms. (Fukuyama 1995, 25–26.) 
 
 It is difficult to describe or define why we trust someone since trust is a complex 
concept. When something is considered complex there is always an amount of 
uncertainty, actions whose results cannot be fully predicted (Nason 2017, 8). If 
trust only where complicated, it could be separated into steps and processed into 
results. This is not feasible with regards to social trust. It might be possible to 
break a trust relationship with a friend into components, but not to fully explain 
our gut feeling of trust in a person. 
 
Computer systems are originally pieces of components that interact in a logical 
way with a set of static rules and algorithms. One could ask why we need trust in 
a system, that perform with a set of predefined rules. It should be possible to 
calculate the output of a computer, but it would not make much sense using a 
computer to compute a result that is already known. A various amount of the 
growth in the world has happened owing to immediately available results 
generated by computers. A process we do not necessary understand but trust. 
 
Trust would not be needed if actions could be undertaken with complete certainty 
and no risk (Lewis & Weigert 1985). Implementing computing processes with 
complete certainty would require a great amount of effort, and every component 
and piece of code would have to be verified by the end user. Utilizing a system 
like that would not very easily contribute to growth. 
 
The application of trust has given society significant gains (Harari 2014). The 
financial revolution which started at the end of the 17th century established a 
system where states could loan money due to general trust that they would pay 
back (Roseveare 1991). Since then, the credit systems have been fine-tuned to 
establish trust in the loaners. However, the general trust occasionally fails which 
leads to an economic crisis. Today, most often such crisis is reflected all over the 
world. 
 
Trust in computer systems are in an infant stage compared to the financial 
system. The first commercial computers were introduced in 1945, after the 
transistor was invented. Only much later have people started to rely on trust 
 when using computers. In the early years of computers, people verified by other 
means the results the computer calculated (Ceruzzi 2003). 
 
Human trust complexity is a major part of all computing. All systems that are in 
use today rely on code and hardware that have been developed by thousands of 
people. It is not feasible to establish an individual trust relationship with everyone 
who is developing these systems. Therefore, certificates play a crucial role in 
establishing trust. 
 
According to Oxfords dictionary in English, a certificate is an official document 
attesting a fact (Soanes & Stevenson 2005). Digital certificates can be used to 
sign computer hardware and code. This certificate ties the signed piece to a 
verified identity. Other attributes can be added to the digital certificate if 
necessary (Azad & Pathan 2014). 
 
In this thesis, we look at the most common methods to verify the integrity of a 
computing platform are examined. More trust in the platform can be established if 
it is possible to verify that every piece of code is the one intended to be used. 
 
2.2 Private messaging and signed verification 
This sub-chapter presents an introduction to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and 
hash functions. PKI is one of the main methods of implementing trust on 
computers. It is used to securely and privately exchange data on the Internet. It is 
also widely used to sign hash values of code and data. 
 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) use public-key cryptography or asymmetric key 
cryptography. Cryptography can be referred to as the science of preventing 
access to sensitive data by parties who are not authorized to access the data. 
Using asymmetric keys, the encryption key is public (public-key) and the 
decryption key is private (private-key). Figure 1 shows the basic scheme of 
encrypting and decrypting information. 
  
Figure 1. Asymmetric-key crypto scheme (Adams & Lloyd 2002, 13) 
 
PKI extends trust with a Certification Authority (CA) that will verify the requester’s 
identity before issuing a certificate and linking the key to that identity. Parties that 
trust the CA can rely on the verification of other parties. Certification is the act of 
binding identity details with a public key (Adams & Lloyd 2002, 85.). 
 
For example, if Bob and Alice want to communicate. Alice registers her 
asymmetric key with her identity to a CA. Bob can then ask for Alice’s certificate 
for the public key through a CA he trusts. Bob then encrypts his message with 
Alice’s public key and sends the message to Alice. Alice is then able to decrypt 
the message with her private key. (Das & Madhavan 2009, 2–5.) 
  
Figure 2. Public Key Infrastructure verification (Vacca 2004). 
 
CAs use trust chaining to extend trust boundaries, hence forming PKI 
hierarchies. A hierarchy has at least one root certificate. Intermediate 
certificate’s are signed with the root certificates private-key. There can be 
many levels of intermediate certificates. Verification can be done by going back 
the chain to the root certificate or through cross-certificate chains that are 
established between intermediate certificates. (Vacca 2004, 23–24.) 
 
Trust provided by PKI is only as strong as the CA chain. If a certificate’s private 
key is compromised by any means, the PKI hierarchy under that key is 
compromised. The process of key revocation is cumbersome, and the initial 
PKI implementation often suffers from problems. Revocation relies on updating 
information on compromised keys and the information is usually published in 
Certification Revocation Lists (CRL). (Vacca 2004, 25.) 
 
Integrity values can be signed by a private key that is registered to a CA. The 
values are most often hashes of the data. A hash is a value returned from a 
 hash function. This function maps data of arbitrary length to a fixed size and 
the process is infeasible to reverse (Azad & Pathan 2014). This function can be 
used to verify data integrity. Due to the fixed length, a small storage is 
sufficient to store hash values. 
 
Together, PKI and hash functions provide a method of establishing trust in 
computer systems. These methods are widely used but can be difficult to 
implement securely. The easiest way is to let a third party perform the 
implementation, thus outsourcing the liability. 
 
 
Figure 3. PKI hierarchy (Vacca 2004). 
 
This model makes it possible to sign malware as well, which can happen if 
access control to the private key fails (Zetter 2019). Because most verification 
systems work automatically, they will only fail when the signature is invalid. The 
signed malware is not noticed until something else fails in the computer system. 
 
2.3 State of Railway Security Systems 
The European Railway Agency (ERA) launched a study to acquire an overview of 
the existing Command, Control and Signalling (CCS) systems. This was done to 
assist ERA with the European Rail Traffic Management Systems (ERTMS) 
deployment. ERTMS aims at replacing the different national train control and 
command systems in Europe. (Buurmans et al. 2018, 6.) 
 
 The ERA study report was finished in 2018, 10 countries were part of the 
research. All Railway Infrastructure Managers in this study were at least 
considering implementing digital-based CCS systems. It is believed that the lack 
of people with expertise in this new field is affecting the adaptation of digital 
systems. Insufficient competence affects the regulatory side which struggles to 
predict the new risks. (Buurmans et al. 2018, 6–8.) 
 
The EN 50126 standard specifies the CCS systems safety requirements. EN 
50126 part 5 specifies functional safety in Railway applications (EN 50126-5: 
2014). Key specifications are made for the development process (Kantamaa & 
Sorsimo 2018). However, few specifications are made on software maintenance 
and patching. Implementations are left to the vendor or contractor that oversees 
maintenance (Stumpp 2019). 
 
The Railway CCS system was in the past a vendor specific implementation with 
specific applications, components and interfaces to comply with national 
specifications (Buurmans et al. 2018). This has made the systems unfavourable 
among attackers due to the limited affect. 
 
Today, new interoperability specifications in Europe and the demand to lower the 
cost of the old relay-based CCS systems, new standardized digital CCS systems 
will start emerging. If no appropriate tools and procedures are implemented, 
standardized systems can become a target for criminals and hackers in the 
future. The next chapter introduces previous attacks on systems similar to those 
that are being introduced into the railway sector. 
 
3 ATTACKING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Attacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can be described as cyber-
physical attacks. They involve more layers than the everyday criminal attack on 
the Internet. In Figure 4, the layers are reproduced from Langner (2013). The IT 
layer is used to inject and spread the malware. The control system layer is used 
to manipulate process control to accomplish damage on the physical layer. 
(Langner 2013, 4.) 
  
In this chapter, three well known attacks against ICS-systems are introduced. 
The oldest attack, Stuxnet, changed the security environment for these systems. 
Before Stuxnet, air gaping these systems to secure them seemed sufficient. The 
amount of resources needed to develop malware for ICS-systems is dramatically 
lower now (Caracano et al. 2018). Common communication protocols, standards, 
equipment and computer architectures will even lower the bar for attackers if the 
security aspect is not taken into greater consideration. 
 
 
Figure 4. Layers of a sophisticated cyber-physical attack (Langner 2013). 
 
3.1 Stuxnet 
The purpose of the Stuxnet attack was to slow down the enrichment of weapon 
grade uranium in Iran’s enrichment facility at Nathanz. The attack utilized the 
Information Technology (IT) layer to manipulate the ICS layer which then caused 
harm to the physical layer. (Langner 2013, 4.) 
 
Centrifugal rotors were broken as an effect of the attack. Because the rotors were 
radioactive, they were troublesome to replace. This meant that enrichment time 
were lost, and the throughput of weapon grade Uranium was decreased. 
  
Two different attacks were carried out between 2007-2010 to accomplish the 
objective of prolonging development of a nuclear bomb in Iran. It is suggested 
that the second attack were introduced later because the attackers wanted faster 
results. This made the second attack bolder and more visible, which eventually 
lead to the detection of the whole attack in 2010. This was approximately two 
years later than the beginning of the first attack. (Langner 2013, 4–5.) 
 
The first attack propagated into the IT layer only through physical media that 
were opened with a certain vendor’s engineering software. Through a laptop, the 
malware was able to reach the ICS-layer where it infected the main Siemens S7-
417 industrial controller which controlled the valves and pressure sensors of 984 
centrifuges. 
 
The malware positioned itself between the legitimate operational logic and the 
analog inputs and outputs (I/O) were it was able to control I/O operations. It 
passed signals or generated faked signals repeatedly to the legitimate logic. 
(Langner 2013, 8–9.). 
 
The first phase malware also de-calibrated the pressure sensors that were 
connected to the Siemens S7-417 controller. This was a measure to hide the 
operation and not directly control the sensors. The direct control of the sensors 
could have been discovered by the facility personnel more easily than the 
recalibration. (Langner 2013.) 
 
Stuxnet’s second IT propagation path was designed with bold tactics and hiding 
was not prioritized. It utilized previously unknown vulnerabilities (zero-days) 
against Microsoft Windows and was able to enter the system as a legitimate 
driver using stolen credentials. It was even able to maintain Command and 
Control functionality to the infected air-gaped ICS system by peer-to-peer 
communication through the IT layer. (Chien et al. 2011, 21–23.) 
 
 Siemens S7-315, a smaller Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) than the S7-
417, was targeted in the second attack. This controller was in charge of the 
Centrifuge Drive System. By suspending the control logic and iterating this 
procedure, the centrifugal rotors were slowed down from 63,000 rpm to 120 rpm 
and up again to the original speed. (Langner 2013.) 
 
During speed up, there is certain critical phases that causes the rotor to vibrate. 
Every time the rotor vibrates, there is a chance that it will break (Langner 2013). 
This eventually had a greater impact than the previous attack. 
 
Due to the aggressive IT propagation path of the second attack, malware 
samples started to appear early 2010. Some were discovered as early as 2009 
but the slow propagation on the IT layer kept the general interest low. (Langner 
2013, 4.) 
 
At least two driver certificates were stolen and used to sign malware that posed 
itself as legitimate Windows drivers. The stolen certificates were from Realtek 
Semiconductor and JMicron Technology Corporation (Langner 2013, 20.). 
 
3.2 Industroyer 
On 23 December 2015, a power outage occurred in Ukraine that left 225,000 
citizens without electricity before Christmas celebration. A year later, on 17 
December 2016, Ukraine suffered another power outage. Both power outages 
were the result of a cyber-attack against the electric power system. (Cherepanov 
2017.) 
 
The first attack took offline at least 27 sub-stations across three energy 
companies. Attackers were successful in compromising the IT system and used 
the Human Machine Interface (HMI) to turn off the sub-stations. Mitigation against 
the attack was slowed down by destroying software and interfaces to the ICS 
system. (Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid 2016, 8– 
9.) 
 
 The first attack utilized legitimate control tools in the IT layer to shut down the 
power. In the second attack, the attackers used tools that were able to control 
switches and circuit breakers directly with their own tools. Four different 
standardized communication protocols were used: 
• IEC 60870-5-101, protocol for monitoring and controlling electronic 
power systems on serial connections. 
• IEC 60870-5-104, extension of 101 to TCP/IP networks. 
• IEC 61850, protocol for multi-vendor communication of electrical 
substation automation systems. 
• OPC DA, software standard for real-time data exchange between 
distributed components. (Cherepanov 2017, 2.) 
 
The first two protocols are part of a set of standards which define systems used 
for telecontrol in electrical engineering and power system automation applications 
(IEC 60870-5: 2020). The former utilizes serial communication interfaces and the 
latter the internet protocol suite (TCP/IP). 
 
IEC 61850 is an international standard for communication networks and systems 
for power utility automation (IEC 61850: 2020). Its aim is to accomplish 
multivendor communication between devices on electrical substation automation 
systems. A device task can be protection, automation, metering, monitoring or 
control. (Cherepanov 2017, 10–12.) 
 
The last protocol the malware used was Microsoft’s OLE for Process Control 
(OPC) which applied several Microsoft technologies for Remote Procedure Calls 
(RPC) to enable real-time data exchanges between distributed components. 
(Cherepanov 2017.) 
 
The malware Industroyer were structured in different payloads for these 
protocols. They were controlled by a launcher that on a trigger date executed the 
payloads. It is not confirmed but strongly believed that this malware were the one 
causing the second power outage in Ukraine. A hard-coded trigger date was 
detected inside the malware that matched the second power outage (Cherepanov 
2017, 
15.). 
  
3.3 Triton 
During the last months of 2017, Mandiant, a subsidiary of FireEye, responded to 
a cyber incident in the Middle East. The attackers were targeting a Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS) which provided emergency shutdown capabilities to 
an industrial process. By examination of the attack, FireEye assessed that the 
attackers were developing a capability to cause physical damage at the facility 
(Johnson et al. 2017). 
 
A SIS is the last safety system in an industrial facility. Its task is to safely 
shutdown the facility in a threatening situation to prevent damage to equipment 
and personnel. It runs independently of other systems, monitoring thresholds and 
activating on its own if values are out of range. (Johnson et al. 2017.) 
 
The attacker compromised the IT layer and gained control to an engineering 
workstation. From the workstation, the attacker reprogrammed the SIS 
controllers. This triggered some controllers to enter a failsafe mode which was 
noticed by the personnel at the plant (Greenberg 2017). 
 
The code that injected the payload to the targeted Triconex Safety Instrumented 
System from Schneider Electric used a zero-day vulnerability. The injected 
malware would have provided remote control capabilities of the SIS device to the 
attackers. (Johnson et al. 2017.) 
 
It is not known which code triggered the failsafe, the injector or the payload. 
However, one of the processors inside the multi-core device triggered a 
redundancy alarm which forced all three main processors to start the safety 
shutdown process. (Caracano et al. 2018, 17.) 
 
Security researchers at Nozomi Networks restructured the process of developing 
and testing malware at the targeted system. Their results indicate that attacking 
ICS is no longer outside the reach of criminals. When Stuxnet was developed, it 
required specialised skills to attack ICS. This is not the case anymore because 
 tools, techniques and equipment are accessible to anyone wishing to start 
developing their own attacks against these systems. (Caracano et al. 2018, 19.) 
 
4 TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE 
The former Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) established in 1999 
served as the foundation upon which the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) was 
formed in 2003. Since the beginning, it has worked on providing an efficient and 
low-cost way to implement trusted computing. A concrete part of the outcome is 
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which has been manufactured and 
implemented into many platforms. (Arthur & Challener 2015.) 
 
The TPM can establish a Trusted Platform (TP) that is able to store early 
firmware measurements from the platform. These measurements can then be 
evaluated against known good values which can reflect on human trust. 
 
TCG has specifications of the TPM implementation for different platforms, the x86 
PC platform specification was utilized in this study with the latest specification 
version 2.0, which is an architectural redesign from the 1.2 version (Arthur & 
Challener 2015, 5). 
 
This chapter starts by introducing the generic TPM provided features. Then the 
components of a trusted platform are examined. Finally, TPM identity and 
attestation is briefly described with reference to the platform boot. 
 
4.1 TPM features 
A TPM can be implemented by at least four different means (TCG 2019): 
• Discrete TPM 
• Integrated TPM 
• Firmware TPM 
• Software TPM 
 
A discrete TPM is a stand-alone chip on a platform. It provides the highest level 
of security by also withstanding hardware tampering. An integrated TPM is also 
 implemented in hardware but incorporated in another chip. This exposes the TPM 
for hardware tampering through exposed interfaces. (TCG 2019.) 
 
Figure 5 shows some of the different TPM implementations and features. 
 
 
Figure 5. TPM implementations and features (TCG 2019). 
 
The rest of the TPM implementations are different software implementations. The 
most common x86 processor manufacturers has implemented the TPM as 
firmware inside their Central Processing Units (CPU). This is the standard 
consumer line implementation. 
 
Intel’s firmware TPM implementation is part of the Converged Security and 
Management Engine (CSME) formerly known as the Management Engine (ME) 
(Ruan 2014). AMD’s implementation is part of the Platform Secure Processor 
(PSP) (Cimpanu 2018). 
 
The firmware TPM is protected inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). 
This is a form of separation from the normal workload running on the platform. 
However, the TPM needs to rely on other software for its security. (TCG 2019.) 
 
This thesis uses a software TPM developed by Ken Goldman from IBM. His 
implementation extends on source code donated by Microsoft. The simulator 
works according to the TCG TPM 2.0 specification (Goldman 2016). 
 
 A software TPM is not intended for production use. It is, however, an efficient way 
to test and develop applications that use TPM features. Here are some of the 
features the TPM provides (TCG 2019): 
• High quality random numbers 
• Cryptographic services 
• Small protected persistent storage 
• Pseudo-persistent store of keys and data 
• Platform identities 
• Signing and verifying digital signatures 
• Certifying the properties of keys and data 
 
The TPM can generate random numbers through a cryptographic function done 
on random seeds implemented inside a protected storage of the TPM. The seed 
information is not accessible directly by the user or the platform, only by the TPM. 
(Trusted Platform Module Library, Part 1: Architecture 2016.) 
 
A seed is implemented as multiple one-time programmable eFuses. Once an 
eFuse-bit is set to the value of 1, it cannot be set back to 0. A high-quality 
random value is injected during manufacturing to the seed which gives the TPM a 
trusted entropy. (TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile 2019.) 
 
Three different seeds are implemented on the TPM. These are maped to different 
life cycle roles with their own authorization. In this thesis only the endorsement 
seed is used, which maps to the endorsement hierarchy. Authorization values or 
methods for accessing the hierarchy are omitted from this study. (Trusted 
Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019.) 
 
Through the seeds, the module is also able to generate keys used for 
cryptographic functions such as encryption, decryption and signing. The TPM 
provides both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services. 
 
The protected persistent storage is small and can only hold a few keys at once. 
By using the seeds and a Key Derivation Function (KDF), pseudo-persistent keys 
can be generated. This is achieved by providing an input for the KDF. If the input 
 and the seed are the same, key generation will be consistent. (Trusted Platform 
Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019.) 
 
By restricting the key usage inside the TPM, an asymmetric private key can be 
part of the platform identity. The public key is available for verification, but the 
private key never leaves the TPM. 
 
4.2 Trusted Platform 
A Trusted Platform is constituted of a Trusted Building Block (TBB). Three 
components are needed (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 
2019): 
• TPM 
• CPU 
• Storage for the initial application on the platform. 
 
The initial application is called the Core Root of Trust for Measurements (CRTM) 
in the TCG specifications. The initial start up script in this study is referred to as 
the CRTM. 
 
Depending on the TPM type, the aforementioned components are implemented 
differently. In a discrete TPM solution, they should all be integrated inside the 
TPM chip. An example of an integrated solution is presented in Figure 6. The 
connections in Figure 6 are also considered part of the TBB. 
 
 
Figure 6. Trusted Building Block (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019). 
 
 The TBB needs to be vouched for by the manufacturer of the platform. The trust 
in a platform starts with the reputation of the manufacturer and the 
implementation of the TBB. The end user should be able to expect that the TBB 
does not compromise the goals of a trusted platforms. (Trusted Platform Module 
Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019, 21-22.) 
 
From the elements in a TBB, three Roots of Trusts can be derived. These are 
TCG specified system elements whose misbehaviour cannot be detected by the 
user. Therefore, these elements need to be trusted in order to establish a Trusted 
Platform. The three Roots of Trust are (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: 
Architecture 2019): 
• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) 
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) 
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) 
 
The RTS is contained inside the TPM. Interactions are only made through the 
TCG specified interfaces. The storage is constituted mostly by shielded space but 
also the accessible Platform Configuration Register (PCR). The PCR plays a 
crucial role in establishing a trusted platform and is described later in this chapter. 
 
The RTM consists of a CPU and the first set of instructions (CRTM) that are 
executed when a system is reset. The CRTM will measure itself and the next 
instruction set that will be run after. The measurements will be stored in the RTS. 
Reporting is done on the contents of the RTS, which is the function of RTR 
(Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019). The report is 
usually a signed digest of the values inside the RTR. The whole TBB is needed to 
accomplish reporting. In addition, a platform identity is needed. 
 
4.3 Platform Identity 
The TPM contains cryptographically verifiable identities for reporting. The feature 
to produce asymmetric keys inside the TPM provides asymmetric aliases for the 
platform. An alias private key should only be usable inside the TPM. (Trusted 
Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019). 
  
An Endorsement Key (EK) is produced when the TPM is manufactured. A 
certificate is signed by the manufacturer for the asymmetric decryption key. The 
certificate can verify that the TPM is produced according to TCG specifications. 
Usually, the platform EK certificate is stored inside the TPM. This can then be 
verified by a PKI chain to the manufacturer. An example of the EK certificate 
generation and verification is shown in Figure 8. (TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning 
Guidance 2017.) 
 
Figure 7 shows an example of the public information of an EK generated by the 
TPM simulator used in this study. The TPM restricts the use of a key through 
attributes. 
 
 
Figure 7. Endorsement Key public information. 
 
Table 1 describes in more detail the function of these attributes for the EK. Keys 
that are generated from seeds are primary objects that acquire automatically the 
attributes fixedtpm and fixedparent (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: 
Architecture 2019, 160). The administrator authorization role is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
 
Table 1. List of Endorsement Key attributes (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 
2019). 
Attribute Description 
fixedtpm The private key can not be extracted from the TPM. 
fixedparent The seed is not extractable from the TPM. 
sensitivedataorigin Key derived from a seed within the TPM. Restricts 
usage to protect the seed value. 
 adminwithpolicy Admin role authorization method. 
restricted Restricts asymmetric key functionality. 
decrypt Type of functionality the key is restricted to. 
 
For reporting purposes, a signing key is needed. This is usually generated later 
by the platform owner. The best practice of reporting is performed through remote 
attestation. This is why the reporting key is called the Attestation Key (AK). 
 
Attestation can be achieved without a TPM. In this study the TPM provided 
functions and methods to accomplish remote attestation is used. Attestation with 
a TPM is performed by signing data inside the TPM. 
 
 
Figure 8. Creation and verification of EK certificate (TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance 2017). 
 
Introduced here is a corporate example where the platform is provisioned to a 
remote attestation service. This is done before it is handed over to the end user. 
Before provisioning, the owner verifies the trust certificates of the platform. In 
 many corporate cases, the owner is an IT administrator. The number of 
certificates available depends on the manufacturer and the supply chain process. 
 
If the owner considers the platform trusted, he generates an AK for the platform 
and provisions the platform to the remote attestation service. In a simple setup, 
the AK is generated under the EK with the attributes shown in Table 2. The 
attribute userwithauth is a policy method that is not further discussed in this 
study. 
 
Table 2. List of requires AK attributes (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 
2019). 
Attribute Description 
fixedtpm The private key can not be extracted from the TPM. 
fixedparent Parent key (EK) is not extractable from the TPM. 
sensitivedataorigin Parent key derived from a seed. Restricts usage to 
protect the seed value. 
userwithauth User role authentication can be provided by 
password, HMAC or policy. 
restricted Key functionality restricted. 
sign Key restricted to signing only. 
 
In this thesis, only a few generic features of the provisioning process are 
examined and more detailed methods are omitted. The endorsement certificate of 
the device requesting enrolment is validated by the provisioning service. This 
proves that the requester uses a certified TPM. 
 
The AK attributes are verified by the provisioning service, and a challenge is 
generated together with the attestation key name. This is then encrypted with the 
public part of the requesters EK and sent back. A certified TPM will only decrypt 
the challenge if the AK is loaded into the requester TPM and the AK name 
matches the response. (TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance 2017.) 
 
It should be noted that this requires a TPM that is developed by TCG standards. 
The EK certificate is crucial because otherwise there is no guarantee that the 
TPM or some other entity will be able to accept an AK generated outside of a 
 TPM. The generic provisioning process is shown in Figure 9. (TCG TPM v2.0 
Provisioning Guidance 2017.) 
 
 
Figure 9. Device provisioning to attestation service (TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance 2017). 
 
4.4 Platform boot 
A Platform Configuration Register (PCR) is a storage that contains one hash of a 
supported hashing function by the TPM. Per supported hashing algorithm, there 
are at least 24 PCRs. SHA-1 and SHA-256 are mandatory in a TPM 2.0 
implementation. (TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0. 
2020.) 
 
When a platform is powered on or reset, it starts the CRTM instruction set which 
provides functionalities to measure itself and the next set of instructions. 
Depending on the TPM implementation, different hardware elements are 
interacting during the CRTM execution. Before the CRTM completes, it shall 
extend the measurement hashes into a PCR. (TCG PC Client Platform Firmware 
Profile 2019.) 
 
 An extend function takes the old hash value, adds the new and hashes it. The 
sequence of extending a PCR needs to be the same throughout resets, because 
extending A before B would not bring the same results as extending B before A. 
The extend function is presented below. 
 
PCRnew := Halg(PCRold||digest) 
The PCRs is started with a default initial condition upon platform reset. The initial 
condition for a PC platform is PCRs 1-16 and 23 all bits zero and PCRs 17-20 all 
bits one. PCR 0 is a special case and acquires an initial value between 4–0 on a 
PC platform. (TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0. 
2020.) 
 
CRTM starts a process of Transitive Trust by measuring itself and the next 
application before handing over execution. No other application measures itself 
than the CRTM. As long as the measured values are represented by trusted 
applications, the software stack can be trusted. (TCG PC Client Platform 
Firmware Profile 2019.) 
 
An ideal situation would be that all software developers publish trusted values of 
their products so that measurements could be verified. This is, however, not the 
case and therefore it is necessary to establish a trusted baseline after installation 
or configuration. If measurements deviate from the previous software installation 
or configuration, it can be assumed that unwanted changes have occured. 
 
When deviation along the chain is spotted, no further software measurements 
can be trusted. This is due to the fact that the previous stage is responsible for 
measuring the next. It has therefore the ability to tamper with the measurement. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the aspects that are measured into each PCR on a PC 
platform. The PCRs 0-7 are considered the Static Root of Trust for Measurement 
(S-RTM) and are only re-producible on a system reset (TCG PC Client Platform 
Firmware Profile 2019). 
 
 Table 3. PCR usage on the PC platform (TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile 2019). 
PCR 
Index 
Static-Root of Trust for Measurements 
0 CRTM, BIOS, Host Platform Extensions, Embedded 
Option ROMs and PI Drivers 
1 Host Platform Configuration 
2 UEFI driver and application Code 
3 UEFI driver and application Configuration and Data 
4 UEFI Boot Manager Code and Boot Attempts 
5 Boot Manager Code Configuration and Data and 
GPT or Partition Table 
6 Host Platform Manufacturer Specific 
7 Secure Boot Policy 
8-15 Defined for use by the Static OS 
 
Figure 10 aims to map different boot specifications to the boot process. It shows 
that the TCG specified Measured Boot covers the whole boot process. Verified 
Boot and UEFI Secure boot usually function together and can verify the firmware 
components utilizing PKI. These methods usually halt the boot process if 
verification fails. (Bratus et al. 2019, 338–339.) 
 
 
Figure 10. Different boot types protecting the software stack (Bratus et al. 2019). 
 
4.5 Attestation 
In this study, the TPM is used to attest PCR values. The TPM uses an attest 
structure that is signed by the provisioned AK. The structure contains a single 
 hash of one or more PCRs referred to as a quote. (Trusted Platform Module 
Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019.) 
 
The actual PCR hashes are not included in the quote. PCR hashes can be 
provided in plain text and then verified by the attestation service through the 
quote. The attestation service takes the plain text hashes and hashes them. If the 
hash matches the quote hash the plain text hashes can be considered same as 
on the attested TPM. (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 
2019.) 
 
Table 4. TPM ATTEST structure (Trusted Platform Module Library: Part 1: Architecture 2019). 
Field Description 
Magic number Prevents external data to be forged as an attest 
struct. 
Quote type Type of the attestation structure. 
Qualified signer Certifies the environment
 the signature was made 
Extra data Functions as an anti-replay nonce. 
TPM clock states Clock, resetCount, restartCount and Safe. 
TPM firmware version Can be used to only allow certain versions. 
Attested Signed hash of selected PCR values. 
 
Table 4 shows the fields used by the TPM in the attest structure (Trusted 
Platform Module Library, Part 2: Structures 2016, p. 110). A quote from a 
simulated device on Nokia’s attestation service can be seen in Figure 11. 
 
 
  
Figure 11. Quote details shown in Nokia Bell Labs Attestation service. 
 
5 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
The aim of simulation in this study is to reproduce a view of the traffic 
management system, including a way of monitoring the device integrity. In this 
study, integrity monitoring is included in another user interface (UI) but could be 
integrated to the traffic operators view in the future. 
 
In order to be able to see changes in device integrity, the device is provisioned to 
an attestation service. The TPM attest feature is then used to report on PCR 
values. 
 
Railway signals must only be tampered with, in a controlled environment, so as 
not to cause real incidents when testing. It is more secure, cost friendly and safer 
to simulate a rail security system virtually than using real equipment. When 
 tampering with firmware on real devices, there is a great risk that the system will 
not be recoverable. 
 
This chapter introduces the different roles implemented for future testing of the 
framework. In this chapter, only the simulation environment administrator’s role is 
introduced in detail. The other roles are introduced in Chapter 7. 
 
In this chapter, the hardware and software needed to run the simulation are 
studied. The purpose is also to examine what services are needed in the process 
and how a particular device is simulated. This chapter ends with the 
documentation on how a small simulation without frontends can be run. 
 
5.1 Simulation Environment Roles 
Since the aim is that this study could be utilized as a test framework in the future, 
different roles are introduced for training, showcasing and testing. The end user 
in this test scenario is the traffic control operator. A simulation administrator is 
defined as the training instructor implementing the scenario for the traffic 
operator. 
 
In addition to these roles, a simulation environment administrator may be 
necessary. This can, of course, be the same person as the simulation 
administrator if he has the required competence. 
 
Simulated scenarios are launched and controlled interactively by the simulation 
administrator. Simulated railway traffic scenarios should be specified and 
implemented according to training purposes. 
 
  
Figure 12. Simulation environment roles. 
 
The infrastructure is managed by the environment administrator. Once the 
scenario is running on a system the administrator’s presence is not necessary 
during the simulation. 
 
5.2 Simulation environment administrator 
For managing the framework that the simulation run on, the simulation 
environments administrator uses common IT administrator tool’s. An overview of 
a framework example can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
This environment can be run on a single computer with an installation of Docker, 
Node.js and Angular. However, the best practice would be to run Docker and the 
simulation admin interface on separate virtual machines. 
  
Figure 13. Overview of the simulation environment. 
 
The simulation admin interface benefits from communicating directly to the host 
machine where the dockerd daemon is running. From the administrator interface, 
the simulation admin can create, start, stop and delete device containers. 
It is also possible to run the admin interface as a container on a hypervisor 
separate from the Docker machine. This is how the simulation is performed in this 
thesis. 
 
5.2.1 Containerization 
Containerization was chosen as the base method for simulating devices. Fully 
virtualized computers need more resources and simulate the underlying 
hardware. Containers use the host system kernel and simulate only the operating 
system, behaving in the same manner independently of the hardware. Figure 14 
demonstrates the difference between a container and a virtual machine 
(Schenker 2020.) 
 
  
Figure 14. Containerization (Schenker 2020). 
 
Docker was chosen as the containerization technology, but other technologies 
would also be applicable. Docker has good documentation online, and a software 
TPM simulation had already been made earlier by the author of the thesis. 
 
Containers are made into run time environments from images by the dockerd 
service which uses Linux technologies as namespaces, control groups and the 
union file system to isolate the environment from the host operating system and 
other containers (Docker 2020). Containers are started from images that consist 
of at least one data layer with needed binaries. In its simplest form, an image can 
consist of one executable binary (Create a base image 2020). 
 
Users mostly utilize Linux operating system images to build Docker containers. 
This thesis utilizes Ubuntu 20.04 Focal as its parent image. In order to be able to 
easily utilize TPM 2.0 tools, they are extended on top of the parent image. 
 
The best practice of building Docker images is specifying a Dockerfile. This 
consists of instructions to run inside the parent image. If all instructions are 
successfully executed, the building process returns an image of the environment 
state. (Schenker 2020.) 
 
The device Docker basic build file is available at Nokia GitHub (TPMCourse 
2020). Table 5 illustrates the used tools for this study that are installed on top of 
the parent image. 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Software included in the device container. 
Software Version Developer 
Ubuntu binaries 20.04 Focal Canonical 
dbus 1.12.x. freedesktop 
tpm2-tss 2.3.2 tpm2-software 
tpm2-abrmd 2.3.1 community 
tpm2-tools 3.2.1  
IBM’s software TPM 2.0 1563 IBM 
Trust Agent  Nokia 
 
5.2.2 Hardware in the loop 
In order to implement a one-to-one simulation of a platform boot, virtualized 
machines can be used running Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) with 
tianocore EDK II (OVMF FAQ 2019). Another option is to use real hardware. 
 
Both options can be directly connected to the simulation environment. In this 
study, the use of real TPMs is fully supported by the Attestation service and the 
simulation environment. TPM EK certificate validation is also supported by the 
attestation service. 
 
The benefits of trusted computing can, however, be showcased with a simplified 
platform boot simulated inside containers. This approach makes the simulation 
easy to showcase anywhere on a normal laptop. The speed of starting and 
resetting a simulation is very fast through device simulation. The whole simulation 
environment can be launched and reset in 2 minutes. 
 
5.2.3 Simulation services 
Docker needs a host with the simulation environment Docker images and a 
running daemon. In order to control the containers from the simulation admins 
frontend, the REST API needs to be opened for the daemon on the host. This 
configuration step is well defined in Dockers documentation (Docker 2020). 
 
 In order to connect the simulation containers a Docker created network is used. 
Docker’s internal Domain Name Server is used to automatically translate 
container hostnames to IP addresses. A container hostname can be given when 
starting the container. 
 
By using DNS, it is trivial to automate configuration when starting up the 
simulation environment since no IP addresses need to be manually added or 
edited. Hostnames for attestation server, mongo database, device controller are 
some used and added to all config files in the building process. 
 
The Node.js development server where the Angular simulation frontend is served 
need to have the Docker daemon host IP address implemented inside the 
Angular proxy.json file. In this study, we are using plain HTTP traffic between the 
frontend and the Docker server. 
 
The test scenario containing device parameters is defined inside the Angular 
application folder. A config.json file describes all simulated containers and also 
the attestation containers. Different scenarios can be implemented with different 
config files. 
 
Connections between rail devices are simulated by a Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) broker. State information and commands from the 
security devices are transported with MQTT protocol version 3.1.1. The service is 
its own container running on the same Docker host. 
 
5.2.4 Attestation service 
 
Nokia Bell Labs in Espoo have been developing their own attestation server to 
showcase the benefits of trusted computing. This thesis is an extension of their 
work, targeting the rail industry. 
 
The developed attestation server is implemented in Python and can be executed 
inside a Docker container. It interacts with attested devices through a REST API 
 and utilizes a separate Mongo database. A user interface has been developed 
with Angular and runs on a Node.js development server. All of these services are 
usually supplied from three different Docker containers that can reside on the 
same dockerd server as the device containers. 
 
The best way to begin a simulation is to first start the attestation services after 
which devices can be provisioned to it. The IBM’s TPM simulator does not have 
an Endorsement certificate. In this thesis, the IBM TPM implementation is 
considered trusted, and no endorsement certificate is implemented or checked 
during provisioning. 
 
5.3 Simulating a Trusted Device 
 
When a container is started, no processes are running as a default. Execution 
can be specified to one executable on the start-up. A container will also stop 
running if it does not have a task to do. 
 
For simulating a device with a container, an execution script is needed to start-up 
more processes than one. Job execution needs to be considered because the 
container must stay alive even if it has no active task. 
 
Because the aim is to simulate to some extent a real platform firmware three 
bash scripts execution is chained on the container start-up. The scripts are: 
• crtm.sh 
• uefi.sh 
• application.sh 
 
The crtm.sh starts execution on the start-up and initiates the software TPM. Then 
it measures itself, extends the hash to PCR 0. Next it moves on to measure and 
extend the hash of uefi.sh to the same PCR. Only after this, it hands over the 
execution to the uefi.sh script. 
 
  
Figure 15. Container start up process. 
 
The uefi.sh initializes bash input and output variables and extends them to PCR 
1. These are later tied to the application that simulates the ICS device 
functionality. The ICS software is represented by the application.sh script which is 
measured in uefi.sh and extended to PCR 2. The chained execution ends with 
the application script that leaves the ICS software running. 
 
The PCR values monitored in the simulated devices are PCRs 0-2. This range 
can simulate the CRTM, firmware and the application and was deemed sufficient 
to reach the aim of this thesis. 
 
Inside application.sh, an automated attestation provision sequence is started 
upon the first start-up of the container. The sequence will first generate an EK 
and AK for the device. Secondly it will try to connect to the attestation service for 
provisioning. After a successful initial provisioning, the device will attest it’s 
firmware by reporting the PCR value range 0-2. Lastly the device generates a 
policy that considers the attested values trusted and attaches the policy to itself in 
the attestation service. 
 
This automatic provision process helps rapid testing. Changes can be made to 
the image and it will be automatically trusted on the start-up. Table 6 shows the 
used environment variables for automatic provisioning. These are implemented in 
the scenario config file, inside the Angular application. 
 
 Table 6. Environment variables for device provisioning. 
Variable Usage 
DEVICENAME Name of the device in the attestation service 
ATTESTATIONCLOUD Cloud is the higher hierarchy to which the 
device belongs to. Policies can be attached to 
this group of devices. 
ATTESTATIONSLICE Lower hierarchy than cloud which the device 
can belong to. Policies can be attached to this 
group of devices. 
ATTESTATIONPCRS TPM PCR definition for the view in the frontend. 
ATTESTATION- 
OPENSTACK 
Not used in this simulation 
 
The Nokia Trust Agent that communicates with the attestation server is also 
started at the end of every start-up. 
 
A device reset is also needed for proper simulation. A reset is triggered by 
running a different script called restart.sh. The script generates a few empty files 
in the filesystem before it kills all other processes inside the container, before it 
hands over execution to crtm.sh. By looking up the generated files during start-up 
change the behaviour from initial start up to reset. This is important because we 
do not want the device to provision itself again on a reset. 
 
The software TPM uses a file called NVCHIP as persistent memory if the file is 
found during TPM start-up. This way, seeds and keys can be stored between 
resets. 
 
5.4 Starting an example environment 
A description of the procedure for starting a small-scale environment with the 
attestation service and a simulated trusted device will conclude this chapter. All 
the services will be started on the same dockerd host and attached to a Docker 
network. 
 
All containers will be started from the command line and not the simulation admin 
interface. The step of downloading or building the containers is omitted from this 
example. The sequence of starting the small-scale environment is the following: 
 1. Create the Docker container network. 
2. Start the mongo database. 
3. Start the attestation server. 
4. Start attestation frontend (optional). 
5. Start the device container. 
Docker daemon start-up commands are in the same order as in Listing 1. 
 
The name of the container image is in the end of the run command, this is usually 
specified as <image>:<version> or <framework>:<type>. The last part of the 
command specifies the command executed inside the container on start-up. The 
command is not needed if the container is built with it or an entry point. By 
specifying a command on start-up, the built-in command is ignored. In listing 1 
the command is added for clarification of the command started. 
 
Listing 1. Command examples. 
 
 
With the network option in Listing 1, every container is attached to the simnet 
network. Both hostname and network-alias option is needed for DNS to work in 
lookup mode. The “env” option adds environment variables to the container which 
are used to specify attestation options on client provisioning. 
 
 6 CASE STUDY: RAIL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The simulation environment described in this study is built to simulate a generic 
interlocking model. The Finnish railway security system is studied as a basis for 
the model. 
 
The railway control system usually consists of sensors, controllers, turnouts, 
traffic lights and radios. The interlocking system is a controller containing a 
protective logic which is responsible for providing safe movement on track 
sections. Integrity failure on the device can have great negative impact on 
security. 
 
This chapter gives an understanding of the Finnish electronic interlocking system, 
and how it protects train environment. The Finnish Rail Traffic Management 
System is studied from the book published by the Finnish transport infrastructure 
agency, this book is consistently used as a reference in this whole chapter 
(Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018). 
 
The first sub-chapter introduces the railway security terminology. The interlocking 
devices tasks are examined before introducing the track section used in this 
study. 
 
6.1 The Finnish rail traffic management system 
The Finnish rail traffic management system consist of four individual systems that 
work together: 
• Interlocking 
• Track vacancy monitoring 
• Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 
• Remote control system 
 
The interlocking system is connected to all other systems and by a predefined 
logic developed through a strict standardized process, it controls other 
equipment. In this study, traffic signals are considered a part of the interlocking, 
because it controls the aspect of the lights. 
  
The track vacancy monitor system provides input signals to the interlocking 
controller. Signals tell the interlocking system which track sections are occupied. 
Vacancy implementation is either done by track circuits or axle counters. 
 
The Finnish Automated Train Protection (ATP) systems abbreviation is ATP-
VR/RHK, this comes from the words valtion rautatie (VR) and ratahallintokeskus 
(RHK) in this study the system will be referred to as ATP. It consists of track side 
devices that can forward messages to a train integrated device, which is able to 
limit the train movement. 
 
Track reservations for train movement are requested by the remote-control 
system from the interlocking system. The remote-control system cannot normally 
override the interlocking systems reservations. 
 
6.2 Interlocking 
 
Safety is the main purpose of the interlocking system. It takes vacancy input 
signals and grants access to remote-control requests if safe passage can be 
routed. The interlocking controls track side traffic signals and data sent to the 
ATP system. 
 
The protective logic in the interlocking system is implemented as an application 
by device specific procedures and tools. The application development process is 
highly standardized, with steps that review, verify, simulate and test the logic 
before it can be used to protect a real track environment. 
 
The interlocking device firmware initializes and maps the input and output 
interfaces to either variables or registers, which the protective logic then uses to 
interact with the track environment. Integrity verification during production use of 
an interlocking device, should consider measuring the firmware and the 
protective logic. 
 
 An overview of the interlocking interfaces is displayed in figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Interlocking devices interfaces (Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018). 
 
Interlocking device integrity failures during production use today, can only be 
spotted by the train driver (Hidden 1989). This can generate accidents before the 
integrity failure is mitigated. 
 
Some interlocking devices are accessible from a Control System network for 
maintenance, this is an attack vector for the attacker (Stumpp 2019). By 
propagating through the IT and Control layer the interlocking device can be 
accessed. Without integrity checks no one can be sure if a device firmware or 
logic has been changed from the network. 
 
6.3 Track section protection 
The track section that is use throughout this study, is introduced in this sub-
chapter together with some of the protective logic. The protection implemented is 
significantly stricter than Finnish track protection standards and only allows few 
input combinations for granting movement (Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018). 
 
 Figure 17 shows the track section and enumerates all track side equipment. 
Every track block is assigned a plain number and can have the status of occupied 
or free. In this study the axle counter input is generated directly to a block. 
 
 
Figure 17. Track section. 
 
In Figure 18 the train T100 occupies block 351 and train T200 block 302. In the 
figure a reservation is done for T100 on the main track, across the track section. 
As shown in this example of reservation, the interlocking device outputs signals 
to control the physical equipment in order to protect every train in the track 
section. The interlocking device controls in this scenario among other things 
(Kantamaa & Sorsimo 2018): 
• the signal aspects. 
• the turnout devices. 
 
The interlocking device have means of verifying that the outputs are according to 
its sent commands, these are mostly implemented with analog signals. Different 
signals are used to verify that traffic lights are showing the right aspect and 
turnouts are pointing in the right direction. 
 
 
Figure 18. Reserved track section. 
  
Figure 19 illustrates that the turnout is wired with inputs from the turnout that can 
signal through a closed circuit the position of the turnout. The outputs in this 
figure could be wired to separate relays controlling a motor, able to switch the 
turnout position from track block 301 to 302 and vice versa. These illustrated 
inputs and outputs will be used in the simulation to demonstrate what can happen 
when they are changed in the firmware mapping phase. 
 
 
Figure 19. Turnout input and output. 
 
 
A signal shows danger for T200, this signals the train not to proceed past the 
traffic light. In Finland there are three main signals which of two are used in this 
scenario, used aspects are proceed (green) and danger (red). (Kantamaa & 
Sorsimo 2018.) The interlocking protective logic or application restricts T200 to 
enter the main track section reserved for T100 movement with the aspect. 
 
The implemented protective logic in the simulation only accepts green aspects for 
traffic lights showing proceed in Figure 19, they change to red after T100 has 
passed the signal. The turnout V311 is in all situations pointing to block 301, this 
is hard coded into the logic. 
 
7 SIMULATED TRUSTED TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
This chapter introduces the method of starting the simulation. Controls accessible 
to the simulation administrator and traffic management operator are examined. 
 The attestation service for assessing system integrity by the traffic management 
operator is examined in the last sub-chapter. 
 
7.1 Simulation administrator’s perspective 
The simulation administrator specifies the scenario, devices and track section 
before the simulation is launched. If necessary, this can be done together with 
the environment administrator. In this study, the scenario introduced in the 
previous chapter is prepared and starts automatically upon simulation start-up. 
Configurations are propagated automatically to the following services and 
devices: 
• Administrator frontend. 
• Attestation services. 
• Interlocking device. 
• Other device containers. 
 
It is recommended to start the mongo database service first, a few seconds 
before the attestation container. The attestation container will however delay the 
start-up until it can acquire a DNS response from the mongo_db host. 
 
The simulation administrator can start all device containers from the User 
Interface (UI) in Figure 20. In this example, all visible containers are already 
started except the MQTT broker. In order to help resetting the scenario, buttons 
for controlling all devices containers are generated under the device container 
heading. 
 
A Docker container status update is requested once a second from the dockerd 
daemon, this helps the administrator to monitor the state of the containers. The 
update can tell the administrator if a container stopped for an unknown reason, 
which helps troubleshooting containers when developing scenarios. The update 
feature can be toggled on and off from the refresh button. 
 
  
Figure 20. Simulation administrator UI. 
 
The simulation administrator has another UI to control the scenario and monitor 
the track situation, this shows the real view of the track section. The UI view can 
be seen in Figure 21 and is otherwise the same as the operators but shows the 
real state of track devices. Operators UI shows the track state interpreted by the 
interlocking device. Controls for setting the scenario and moving the train is 
included in the administrators UI. 
 
  
Figure 21. Simulation administrator real view. 
 
By changing the inputs from a turnout device vice versa in the interlocking 
containers application or firmware changes the perception of the track state for 
the operator. The interlocking device believes that the turnout points to track 
block 302 when it in fact points to 301, this deviation can be seen by examining 
both UIs. 
 
The train scenario simulation can be set and controlled in the real track view. The 
button, set scenario, initializes the simulation scenario and sets trains in the 
starting position as introduced. The administrator can move the train T100 
forward to simulate movement across the track section. 
 
7.2 Traffic management operator’s perspective 
The traffic operator has a similar track section UI as the simulation administrator 
but without the control buttons and the real track view. The view is displayed in 
Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Operator view of the track section. 
 
 Displayed in Figure 23 is the attestation UI for integrity monitoring and validation, 
this is accessible for the operator. The figure shows the main view were devices 
are assigned to a cloud and a trust slice, which is done automatically when the 
devices are provisioned. 
 
 
Figure 23. Operator view of attestation UI. 
 
Depending on the ruleset different properties are measured when attested, a 
basic ruleset is used in this study for the devices. Each trust slice can have its 
own ruleset and rules. The rules attached to the simulated devices in this study 
are: 
• Correct System Measurements 
• Valid Signature 
• Valid Type Field 
• Valid Magic Field 
• Valid Firmware 
 
Correct system measurements are validated if the monitored PCRs contain 
values that are considered trusted, this is measured by the attest hash which is a 
hash of the monitored PCR values. In the study simulation PCRs 0-2 are values 
monitored. 
 
The signature is valid if the attest structure is signed by the corresponding AK 
that the device was provisioned with. Type validation reflects on the attestation 
structure and attested parameters. The magic field indicates that the attest 
 structure begins with a predefined value which restricts the TPM from only 
signing an attest structure generated inside the TPM. Firmware validation verifies 
the version of the TPM in the attested device (Trusted Platform Module Library: 
Part 1: Architecture. 2019.) 
 
Validated trust decisions displayed in Figure 24 can be explored in the attestation 
UI by going into an elements details. 
 
 
Figure 24. Last trust decision 
 
Attesting a device can be done from the UI, every device in the study simulation 
automatically attests itself on reset. When a device is attested it will return a 
quote with information to validate the ruleset. Quote details are accessible from 
the UI, these are displayed in Figure 25. 
  
Figure 25. Quote details 
 
Restart count reflects on device restart, this value is not used in the study. Safe 
and extra data are other values omitted from this study. The purpose of the 
magic, type, signature and firmware fields were explained, in Figure 25 the 
values can be studied. 
 
Fields in red contain values that have changed between quotes. Clock value 
should increase which makes the signature also differ between quotes. Extended 
rules can be generated on values in the quote, for example a change in the clock 
backwards could easily be detected by a rule. 
 
Reset count reflects on TPM reset which happens on a device restart. On a 
simulated restart this value increases, the restart count is omitted. Qualified 
signer is the AK name in this study, this is supplied to the attestation service 
when the device is provisioned. 
 
The most interesting value in the quote for this study is attested, this is the hash 
of the monitored PCRs. During the last phase of device provisioning in this 
 simulation, the device measures itself and generates the attest hash in the rule. 
This is the trusted value when the simulation is started and reflects on the correct 
system measurement rule. 
 
General element details are accessible from the attestation UI, these are 
displayed in Figure 26. The details contain the name and IP address that was 
applied during device provisioning. Openstack ID can be used for additional 
identity information but omitted in this study. Both EK and AK public keys are 
displayed in the figure which after a timestamp is listed from the day the device 
was provisioned. 
 
Figure 26. Element information. 
 
 
The validation of keys and the EK certificate is displayed in the end of the 
information in Figure 26. In this study scenario keys are valid if they have the 
 correct attestation key attributes explained in Chapter 4. The server can check 
the EK certificate if it has access to the CA chain, this feature is omitted from the 
study. 
 
In the home view of the attestation UI displayed in Figure 26, the operator can 
with a single view acknowledge that every device attached to the simulation is 
trusted. The traffic management system can be considered trusted according to 
the ruleset applied, because every validation check assigned has been 
successfully validated. In the next chapter an untrusted view is examined. 
 
8 ATTACKING THE TRUSTED RAILWAY SIMULATION 
Attacking the simulation is introduced in this chapter, this is done through the 
simulation administrator role. How to tamper with the interlocking firmware and 
generate a critical flaw, that will generate a dangerous situation is explained in 
this chapter. 
 
The chapter concludes with explaining how the firmware change can be 
discovered with the attestation UI and what kind of mitigation procedures could 
help fixing the critical situation. 
 
8.1 Tampering a simulated interlocking device 
The attacks studied in Chapter 3 indicate that propagation through the IT layer 
can give access to the ICS layer for an attacker. No simulation of propagation is 
implemented in this study, the aim is to discover attacks after tampering has 
happened. In order to tamper with the interlocking device, the simulation 
administrator directly edits the firmware and triggers a restart. 
 
The uefi.sh script acquires virtual inputs and outputs during start-up, which are 
mapped to variables that the security application use. In Figure 27 input 1 is 
mapped to the application variable input 301 which represents the connection to 
track block 301 in turnout V311. When turnout V311 is pointing to track block 
 301, an active signal is generated from the turnout device to the application 
variable. 
 
The interlocking operates its outputs according to the application logic. 
 
 
Figure 27. Initial uefi.sh mapping. 
 
When the interlocking requires to switch a turnout, it generates a signal on the 
corresponding output to which it wants the turnout to point. In this simulation an 
input will immediately indicate that the turnout has switched to another track 
block. An overview of the track section and the connections from the turnout is 
displayed in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28. Inputs and outputs from interlocking to V311. 
 
In order to simulate an error that is not visible in the traffic operators normal track 
UI, the input and output mappings are changed in the uefi.sh script. Variables 
represent the physical interfaces in the script, the simulation administrator can 
directly edit the variable values inside uefi.sh which resides in the interlocking 
containers file system. 
 
 Table 8 shows the original variable values and how they can be flipped to 
introduce a dangerous situation for the simulated track environment. Figure 29 
illustrates how the flipped mappings connect to the application logic. 
 
Table 7. uefi.sh mapping variables. 
Variable Original Value Edited value 
INPUT1 301 302 
INPUT2 302 301 
OUTPUT1 301 302 
OUTPUT2 302 301 
 
After the file has been edited by the simulation administrator, a restart is required 
for the changes to take effect. Restarting can be done from inside the interlocking 
container through the restart.sh script or starting the container after it has been 
stopped. Crtm.sh starts the boot process and hands over execution to the uefi.sh 
script which will extend the variable values to PCR 1 before mapping them to 
Linux environment variables. 
 
Last step in the boot sequence starts after the application.sh is extended to PCR 
2. The interlocking application is the last to start after a successful restart. 
 
 
Figure 29. Flipped uefi.sh mapping. 
 
The uefi.sh is the glue between the physical interface and the application 
interface. The interlocking software loads its protective logic last with the 
variables provided by uefi.sh. No change is done in the protective logic inside the 
train application to affect the end functionality. 
  
8.2 Characteristics of attacks 
The PCR measurements of register 1 is incorrect after the explained tampering 
and restart of the interlocking device. The reported value does not match the 
initial measurement made on the containers first start up. 
 
The change in mappings cannot be spotted by the traffic operator in his UI shown 
in Figure 30. However, the turnout V311 is pointing to track block 302 even if it is 
showing it as pointing to 301, this is confirmed in the simulation administrator’s UI 
in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 30. Operator view of turnout V311. 
 
 
Figure 31.Real view of turnout V311. 
 
By using the attestation UI, the traffic management operator can spot an integrity 
change in the interlocking device. The interlocking device belongs to the Rail 
Cloud and the Control slice, both instances are displayed in Figure 32 as 
untrusted with a red color. 
 
  
Figure 32. Untrusted control slice. 
 
The operator can open the slice and view all devices trust state attached to it. A 
red indicator shows that there is an issue with the interlocking device in Figure 
33. Details of the device can be studied by clicking on the name of the device. 
 
 
Figure 33. Untrusted interlocking container. 
 
The last trust decision is displayed in the details in Figure 34. The correct system 
measurements rule has failed validation in the figure, this means some of the 
PCR values are not considered trusted. 
 
  
Figure 34. Last Trust Decision. 
 
By opening the PCR values as displayed in Figure 35, the operator can spot that 
the issue is generated from an untrusted value in PCR 1. This relates back to the 
flipped inputs and outputs. Even if the operator do not identify the source of the 
problem he identify at which software level the mitigation has to start. 
 
 
Figure 35. Host Platform measurements untrusted. 
 
The attestation trust view could be propagated onto the traffic management 
control UI. This could show device integrity failures immediately when the 
attestation service spots them and would not require the operator to open a 
different UI. 
 
Continuing operations without spotting an integrity failure presented, the train 
would most probably derail at V311 or crash into the other train on track block 
302. This would depend on the speed of the train and the length of the V311 
turnout. 
 
 Turnouts can have a lower speed limit than the one on the main track when 
turning the train to another track. Depending on the length of the turnout the 
speed limit can be as low as 35km per hour. The main track in the presented 
scenario could still support speeds up to 160km per hour. (Kantamaa & Sorsimo 
2018.) 
 
There are previous incidents where train accidents have happened due to flipped 
analog signals. Without integrity monitoring, only the train driver can spot the 
turnout fault introduced in this study. (Hidden 1989) 
 
8.3 Mitigation 
Mitigation of an integrity failure of a device depends on the security procedure. 
When a device fails the rule check a strict protection policy could be put in place 
to only allow manually controlled movement. However, the attestation feature 
introduced in this study could provide a tool to impose finer policies on failure. 
 
Testing and verifying that certain elements can provided sufficient protection 
even with a certain failure, could speed up traffic movement during mitigation. 
 
The TPM approach never leaves the device inoperable even if integrity tests fail, 
this is the opposite of what PKI verification provides. This is especially an 
advantage for remotely located devices, which still could be updated remotely 
and attested after failure. 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
Presented in this chapter are the answers to the thesis questions: 
• How can a firmware integrity failure in the security system lead to a 
dangerous situation in the rail environment? 
• How can a railway traffic operator validate the firmware integrity of 
the security system? 
 
The questions aim to find a solution for the problem on noticing and mitigating 
integrity failures in ICS-systems. The first question seeks answers of the 
 necessity in integrity measurements in the rail environment. The second question 
seeks a solution for noticing integrity failures and help in mitigation of the 
problem. 
 
Indications can be made by studying the attacks presented in the background 
literature, that there is a need for firmware integrity monitoring in the ICS layer. In 
the case of Stuxnet and Triton, it would have provided an indication of a deviation 
from the normal software. 
 
In the simulation an attack similar to Stuxnet were implemented into the rail 
environment, this changed interface mappings in the firmware before the 
protective software is executed. Even if the protective applications integrity would 
be monitored and intact, the cyber-physical functionality would have changed. 
This indicates that the integrity monitoring should be implemented in the lowest 
level possible. 
 
The simulation results show that by manipulating the firmware, in the railway 
security system dangerous interlocking outputs can be produced. These can be 
discovered by the implemented TPM and attestation solution. This only considers 
checking the integrity during device start up, no dynamic checking is 
implemented in this study. 
 
By restricting firmware and software changes to only take affect after a reboot, 
integrity monitoring with the presented solution will work without dynamic integrity 
monitoring. ICS devices mostly function in a predefined which fits the static TPM 
measurements. 
 
Validation and maintenance of trusted values was omitted from this thesis. In the 
study the operator was monitoring trusted values that were established by 
reasoning. It is not the optimal way to establish trust, but it still provides means of 
discovering tampering and it can be extended later to reflect on trusted values 
reported by developers or manufacturers. 
 
 Additional personnel could be alerted to evaluate the trust state of a device which 
validation fails against the device ruleset. By using attestation, the devices that 
fail integrity checks are noticed, it can even pinpoint the software level where 
integrity have degraded. This helps alerting the right maintenance for mitigation. 
 
10 DISCUSSION 
A discussion on the general success of the study, reliability analysis and some 
feedback on the theory studied in this thesis are included in this chapter. 
Future research and study topics conclude this chapter.  
 
Combining all pieces together for this study was a challenging task, Trusted 
Computing and the TPM alone includes a large amount of information. 
Implementing the TPM to the rail environment simulated in this thesis is possible 
but going forward needs more insights from the industry. The interaction with the 
assigner of the work and the railway industry was crucial for this work to succeed.  
 
10.1 Reliability analysis and feedback 
Interlocking devices were studied in a general aspect in this thesis. The 
tampering procedure where implemented with background information from 
previous ICS attacks and PC platform knowledge from the UEFI specification. 
Therefore, it is not known how many interlocking devices could be affected by an 
attack aiming for changing interface mappings. 
 
Additional security implementations than the interlocking system were not 
simulated, these could provide features that would mitigate the dangerous 
situation presented in this study. However, the interlocking system is complex 
and can consist of hundreds of inputs and outputs. Changes or failures in the 
firmware or software can most probably in some case present an unwanted  
 
Publications on ICS attacks could state more clearly the affected layer, in most 
cases it is unclear if the firmware level where compromised or only controlled 
through the IT layer. This tendency can make companies, industries and 
 organizations focus on wrong security implementations. The ICS kill chain can be 
used to describe the compromised layer in detail (Assante & Lee 2015). 
 
10.2 Suggestions for further study 
Extensions on this thesis could include: 
• Availability of TPM implementations in interlocking devices 
• Simulation with TPM implementation in a real rail simulator 
 
First the TPM availability should be studied of the devices in the industry, if there 
are no implementations the following studies could be done. 
 
One study could be conducted to explore if existing equipment could be replaced 
by other including a TPM. Another study could be made where the measurement 
method would be changed from the TPM to another model supporting attestation. 
 
Once hardware with needed features are acquired, simulating the integrity 
measurements with equipment in a proper rail simulator could be studied. 
Railway interlocking simulators exist and are a part of the software logic 
verification and testing procedures. If the TPM exist in some of the equipment this 
study could easily be made. 
 
When the measurements are technically possible to do on a device in the rail 
environment next steps could be considered: 
• Evaluating the effectiveness of static firmware measurements on 
interlocking devices software stack 
• Communication method for value reporting 
• Procedure for establishing trusted values in the rail industry 
• Trust policy generation and mitigation procedures 
 
The first study should evaluate the protection provided by the measurements. If 
the logic can be tampered with during runtime, additional tools are needed to 
protect the integrity. 
 
 Reporting the measurements requires a communication method. As shown in this 
study, reporting does not need additional security it is protected by the attestation 
key. If IP connectivity is provided, measurements can be reported to an 
attestation server. 
 
Establishing trusted values is a larger task which expands back to the supply 
chain and most probably includes many different vendors. These are all 
responsible for different stages of production and software development. 
Establishing trust backwards to the supply chain will probably take time. A study 
could be made on considerations for a fully trusted supply chain. Another study 
could evaluate the options today, for establishing a trust state without 
considerations on the supply chain. From these two studies a third could be 
made to outline the steps from today to acquire a fully trusted software stack with 
values provided from vendors in the supply chain. 
 
By being able to pinpoint the integrity measurement in a certain device and a 
certain layer of software, different mitigations could be established for different 
situations. This could span into different restriction levels depending on the 
failure. Traffic flow would not be restricted in a minor failure to the same extent as 
in a major one. This requires however an extensive amount of study and testing 
to be able to assure secure implementation. 
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